During the last years, a wave of mergers in the pharmaceutical sector has taken place, not only at the European but also at the global level. Within the pharmaceutical sector (a high-tech sector, with considerable impact on consumer welfare), the concentration operations have some features not encountered in traditional sectors and the main dilemma is the uncertainty about the post-merger results, in terms of R&D output. To avoid this anti competitive lessening in innovation, and consequently, the deterioration of consumer welfare, a tailored Merger Control in the pharmaceutical field is necessary in order to respond to the specific needs of the sector. This demand is addressed by the ?Innovation Market? analysis, which studies the merging overlapping pipelines aiming to maintain a level of competition in the R&D market. This is the path to foster the competition in the future product market. The objective of this paper is to present the pertinent application of the ?Innovation Market? in the framework of pharmaceutical mergers. Moreover, this thesis will discuss how the American Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission apply the ?Innovation Market? analysis, through three different Merger Cases between pharmaceutical undertakings
